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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of globalization on social protection expenditures in European 
countries. The analysis adds to the literature due to its special focus on (a) the Eastern 
European countries and (b) on differences in globalization effects between welfare regimes. 
We find evidence in favor of the compensation hypothesis in Western Europe which is driven 
by the conservative welfare regime, outweighing the efficiency effect of globalization in the 
social-democratic welfare regime. In Eastern European countries the efficiency effect is 
predominant. No globalization effect is found for the liberal and the southern welfare regimes. 
Our results indicate some convergence within Western Europe and a divergence between the 
East and the West of Europe. We  stress the importance of disaggregating by welfare regimes 
when exploring the effects of globalization on public social protection expenditures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 Introduction 
This paper analyzes the effects of globalization on social expenditures as a share of total 
public expenditures in Western and Eastern European countries. A particular focus is on 
differences in the globalization effect across welfare regimes.  
In the literature two hypotheses about the direction of the globalization effect on social welfare 
expenditures are advanced: the efficiency and the compensation hypotheses. The efficiency 
hypothesis argues that globalization generally restrains governments via increased budgetary 
pressure due to trade liberalization and increased factor mobility (Dreher et al (2008a)). 
Moreover, fiscal competition among governments for mobile factors of production may lead to 
a relative decline in the supply of public consumption goods in general and welfare 
expenditures in particular (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986); Sinn (1997)).2 More 
specifically, the share of public consumption goods in total public expenditures might 
decrease as a large share is frequently seen as an impediment to international 
competitiveness. Thus, globalization leads not only to a general decline in public expenditures 
but also to a shift towards public inputs, which benefit firms (see Keen and Marchand (1997); 
Matsumoto (2000)).  
In contrast, the compensation hypothesis argues that governments expand the welfare state 
to insure citizens against increased economic risks due to globalization (Rodrik (1997 and 
1998); Garret and Mitchell (2001); Swank (2002)). It is in the interest of governments to 
expand social welfare expenditures as citizens (voters) seek to be compensated by the public 
sector (Rodrik (1998)). Thus, the compensation hypothesis predicts a demand-led change in 
the structure of government expenditure in favor of public consumption goods and social 
expenditures in particular.  
The two views need not be interpreted as competing hypotheses. They rather constitute two 
effects operating in  opposite directions, off-setting each other. As Dreher et al (2008a) argue, 
one can think of the government as balancing the benefits and costs of providing public goods 
and services. Globalization leads to a downward pressure on public expenditures, on public 
consumption goods in particular, through the efficiency channel. At the same time, according 
to the compensation hypothesis, the demand for public social expenditures rises and so does 
the associated benefit or incentive for the policy maker.  
Hence, no clear-cut theoretical predictions about the effects of globalization on the share of 
social welfare expenditures in total expenditures may be  given. Thus, empirical exploration is 
required to ascertain  whether the evolution of the social welfare expenditure share is 
dominated by the efficiency or the compensation effect.  
A number of empirical papers (see the surveys provided by Dreher et al (2008a) and Gemmel 
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 Throughout the article social expenditures, social protection expenditures, social welfare 
expenditures and expenditures on social protection are used interchangeably. 
et al (2008)) try to shed light on this issue. The major part of this empirical research proceeds 
by modeling either total government expenditures or a particular element of public spending 
as a function of one or more proxies for globalization. Usually a country’s openness to trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) or some compound globalization measure (see Table 1 in 
Gemmel et al. (2008); Adam and Kamas (2007); Görg et al. (2007); Potrafke (2009)) is  used 
to proxy the globalization phenomenon. Recently, several papers also analyze the impact 
globalization has on the composition of government expenditures by jointly relating various 
components of public expenditures to proxies for  globalization (see Dreher et al. (2008a); 
Gemmel et al (2008); Sanz and Velazquez (2007); Shelton (2007)).  
Unfortunately, like theoretical predictions the  empirical evidence is also ambiguous, as the 
number of studies supporting the efficiency hypothesis is matched by studies favoring the 
compensation hypothesis (see Gemmel et al (2008), pg. 156). Moreover, some studies (e.g. 
Dreher et al (2008a); Sanz and Velazquez (2007)) find no globalization effect at all. Finally, 
Bretschger and Hettich (2002) argue in favor of existing complementarities between the 
efficiency and compensation hypotheses. They find that globalization has a negative and 
significant impact on corporate income tax rates. At the same time globalization also raises 
social expenditures. Thus, „the efficiency and the compensation hypotheses therefore both 
have a role in explaining government behaviour, the former for revenue, the latter for 
expenditure.” (Bretschger and Hettich 2002, p. 714) 
Notable features of the available studies are that most of them are based on a sample of 
advanced OECD countries (see Table 1 in Gemmel et al (2008)) and none of them explicitly 
analyses the influence of welfare regimes on the dissemination of globalization effects. These 
observations are the starting points for the current study. Based on the available prior work, 
this paper seeks to explain the effect of globalization on social protection expenditures as a 
share of total public expenditures. We add to the literature by focusing on differences between 
Western and Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in the EU and on the isolation 
of globalization effects conditional on the welfare regimes in force. Various proxy variables for 
the globalization process are used in the empirical estimations (openness to trade and FDI as 
well as compound globalization measures capturing several aspects of the multi-facetted 
globalization phenomenon).  
The  focus on CEECs is chosen because  globalization might exert different effects on 
transition countries compared to advanced Western European democracies: On the one 
hand, Eastern European governments have been especially active in using fiscal policy tools 
like cuts in effective corporate income taxes (e.g. Bellak and Leibrecht (2009)), the 
introduction of flat-rate personal income taxes (e.g. Keen et al (2006)) or the creation of 
special economic zones (e.g. World Bank (2008)) to attract foreign capital. These tax and 
subsidy decisions may necessitate budget consolidation in terms of social expenditure cuts. 
On the other hand, after the transition crisis unemployment has increased and labor force 
participation rates of women and elderly people have decreased significantly (Havlik and 
Landesmann (2005); Onaran (2008)). In particular, privatization-led FDI went along with early 
pension schemes for the older population, dramatically increasing the need for social 
protection expenditures. Moreover, the process of accession to the EU might have generated 
EU level external pressures for the development of welfare states as well as advances in 
domestic parliamentary democracy, which can militate towards high levels of welfare provision 
(see Orenstein and Hass (2005)).  
For the Western countries, we explicitly separate the effects of globalization on countries 
grouped by the welfare regimes in force.3 The country specific institutional and political 
context may make a difference in terms of mediating the effects of globalization. Specifically, 
welfare regimes, with their particular levels and structures of expenditures on social welfare, 
display path-dependency as national traditions, institutions, resource dependency, cost of 
alternatives, and voters’ interests transform common challenges into welfare regime specific 
challenges (Scharpf and Schmidt (2000); Taylor-Gooby (2001); Esping-Andersen (1996); 
Swank (2001)). Thus path-dependence may create an institutional lock-in of governments and 
citizens’ behaviors. For instance, in generous welfare states expectations as well as 
dependency relations by citizens may be created which cannot be changed quickly given the 
public support for welfare state measures and governments’ electoral considerations. Then 
scaling down of social protection expenditures is relatively unlikely. In contrast, if social 
protection is not widespread, it might be hard to form the coalitions to demand it under the 
competitive pressures of globalization and limited room for tax increases (see Kautto and 
Kvist (2002)). In this case, scaling up social protection expenditures is rather unlikely. 
However, several authors (e.g. Brady et al (2005); Adelantado and Cuevas (2006)) point out 
that globalization may lead to welfare retrenchment in  generous welfare states like the 
Scandinavian countries, while forcing an increase in  less generous welfare regimes. This 
view implies convergence towards the middle. Downward convergence may be related to the 
existence of limits to growth of the welfare regime given already existing high tax rates leaving 
little room to increase spending and taxation (Huber and Stephens (2001)). Upward or “catch-
up” convergence of the less generous welfare regimes might be triggered by  increasing 
demand for compensation along with globalization and the need to make openness politically 
acceptable or by increased political integration in the context of the EU (Kautto and Kvist 
(2002)). These arguments again support the view that globalization should exert different 
effects across welfare regimes. 
                                               
3 The disaggregation by welfare regimes is done for the Western countries only as for CEECs data 
restrictions are binding. Thus, we cannot disaggregate this country group by welfare regimes. Yet, the 
CEECs seem to constitute an own type of welfare regime (see section 2). Moreover, the section 
containing robustness checks also includes the estimation results for the case where CEECs enter the 
empirical model as an additional welfare regime. 
We concentrate on public social protection expenditures here as these expenditures are 
indisputably the expenditure category that one expects to be positively (negatively) affected 
by the compensation (efficiency) effect of globalization.4 Other public spending categories can 
be viewed simultaneously as public consumption goods and as public inputs. For instance, 
education expenditures might be considered a public input as human capital is a factor of 
production.
5
 Thus, it is not entirely clear whether globalization’s efficiency effects should 
reduce or increase these expenditures. Concentrating on social expenditures reduces this 
ambiguity. Note that we normalize social protection expenditures by total public expenditures. 
This normalization more narrowly reflects the expenditure priorities set within the public sector 
than normalizing by GDP (see Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001)). However, to capture the 
importance of the public sector in an economy we also control for the (one year lagged) share 
of total public expenditures in GDP in the estimations. 
Based on a two-way fixed effects estimator and on the operationalization of the multi-facetted 
phenomenon of globalization by three KOF globalization indices (see Dreher (2006b) and 
Dreher et al (2008b))6 we find evidence in favor of the compensation hypothesis in Western 
Europe. However, we see that this compensation process is mainly driven by a conservative 
welfare regime. In contrast, in social-democratic welfare regimes evidence in favor of the 
efficiency hypothesis is established. These different trends are consistent with the 
convergence view outlined above. However, neither upward convergence nor downward 
pressure is established for the southern and liberal welfare regimes. Concerning CEECs, the 
paper finds evidence in favor of the efficiency hypothesis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section two reviews literature on institutional background 
and welfare regime typologies. Section three presents the model applied in the empirical 
analysis. Section four describes the variables and databases used and section five presents 
the results. Section six concludes the paper.  
 
2 Grouping of countries into welfare regimes 
The welfare state literature indicates considerable heterogeneity among Western European 
countries and between the Western and the Eastern countries related to the institutional 
setting of a country. Esping-Andersen (1990) identifies three welfare regimes according to 
indices of decommodification and stratification in 18 OECD countries in the post-war period: 
                                               
4 We are grateful to the referee who pointed out these aspects. 
5 Note that the widely used classifications of expenditure categories used by Kneller et al (1999) as 
well as Oxley and Martin (1991) and Sounders (1993) also differ in this respect.  
6
 KOF is short for Konjunkturforschungsstelle located at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 
Zurich. 
(i) social-democratic regimes, which are universalistic and egalitarian with high degrees of 
decommodification, little stratification and a limited role for privatized social services (countries 
included in this regime are Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway); (ii) the conservative regime, 
strongly associated with employment protection with the family at its  heart  (Germany, 
France, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the Netherlands) and (iii) the liberal 
regime with low decommodification, high stratification, a restricted  state role and a significant 
private insurance contribution (UK, USA, Ireland, Canada, Australia).  
This categorization has been criticized in respect of the range of countries and regimes, the 
overemphasis on cash benefits and the absence of gender implications (see Bambra (2006); 
Kasza (2002); Leibfried (1992)). Due to its simplicity and wide use in the literature, we use 
Esping-Andersen’s classification, but extend it by adding a separate welfare regime for the 
southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and Malta) as suggested 
by Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997). According to Ferrera (1996) southern countries are inter 
alia characterized by a highly fragmented and polarized welfare regime with generous 
pensions paired with substantial gaps in the social safety net, a departure from the corporatist 
tradition in the field of health care, a highly collusive mix between public and private 
institutions in the welfare sphere and the persistence of clientelism in the distribution of cash 
subsidies. 
While some studies see welfare states in post communist countries within the liberal welfare 
regime, based on a mix of social insurance and social assistance and a partial privatization of 
social policy with just a few corporatist attributes (e.g. Ferge (2001); Standing (1996)), others 
argue that the CEECs constitute a separate post-socialist regime type (Aidukaite (2004); 
Lelkes (2000)).  
Moreover, Fenger (2007) distinguishes a “post-communist European type" welfare regime and 
a "former USSR type" regime. He argues that the post-communist European type (including 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) seem to mix 
characteristics of both the conservative and the social-democratic types of Esping-Andersen. 
Fenger (2007) defines the former USSR type (including Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Russia and Ukraine) as characterized by high levels of female participation, a rather extensive 
public sector, high economic growth and high inflation. 
Alternatively, Orenstein and Hass (2005) distinguish between European and Eurasian post-
communist welfare states where the European category includes the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the more successful Balkan and former Yugoslav republics 
(Slovenia, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria) and the Baltic states (Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia). The Eurasian category brings together the former Soviet republics 
excluding the Baltic countries. According to Orenstein and Hass (2005), a pervasive "Europe 
effect" in the domains of economics, politics and state administration derived from good 
prospects of joining the EU increased these states’ commitment and ability to support welfare 
state spending. In the domestic political domain, the accession process has not only 
reinforced parliamentary democracy but also enabled interest groups to lobby for a 
continuation of high levels of welfare provision. In the administrative domain, old EU member 
states, which feared mass immigration and social dumping from the East, pushed for the 
development of welfare states in the CEECs. According to this thesis, there would be less of a 
difference between the Baltic and other countries within the CEECs (see Orenstein and Hass 
(2005) for details). 
Bohle and Greskovits (2007) distinguish between three types of welfare regimes in the 
CEECs: a neoliberal type in the Baltic States, an embedded neoliberal type in the Visegrad 
states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and a neo-corporatist type in 
Slovenia. Their classification is based on the countries’ institutions and performances in 
marketization, industrial transformation, social inclusion and macroeconomic stability. In their 
model legacies and initial choices as well as transnational influences play important roles in 
defining these different trajectories. 
Taken together, the studies dealing with post communist countries suggest that there is some 
heterogeneity in the welfare regime type across them. However, the new CEE EU member 
countries seem to have rather similar welfare regimes in force. I 
It is important that these countries constitute a particular welfare regime type which is different 
from those in force in West European countries. This provides further justification for splitting 
countries between West and East in the empirical analysis.  
Figure 1 explores whether these classifications fit our data. 7 It shows the development of 
social protection as a share of total public expenditures, disaggregated by welfare regimes 
and for the CEECs. The figure demonstrates that there is a link between the respective 
welfare state regime and the share of expenditures on social protection. The share of social 
protection spending in the conservative countries, starting from about 36% increased across 
time and converged with that in social-democratic countries. Conservative and social-
democratic regimes have proportions of social spending over 40%, when the average of the 
whole period is considered. This picture is in line with Bambra (2006), who finds evidence of 
convergence between the two regimes. There is also a modest increase in the share of social 
protection expenditures in the southern welfare regime, although the level is still lower than for 
the social-democratic and conservative regimes. The liberal welfare regime has also 
preserved a rather low share of social protection expenditures. Finally, since the year 2000 
the CEECs included in the sample have median shares of social protection expenditures 
                                               
7 Due to missing data we cannot include Bulgaria in the analysis. However, we include Norway in the 
group of Western European countries. Moreover, the latter also contains Cyprus and Malta due to their 
clear institutional difference from the CEECs. In total we have 27 countries included in the analysis: 
the EU-27 less Bulgaria plus Norway (also see section four).  
comparable to those of the liberal and the southern regimes. The development over the years 
1995 to 2000 is dominated by the Czech Republic which experienced a marked increase in 
the share of social expenditures in this period (see Eurostat 2007 and 2008 for details).  
 
Figure 1 Social protection expenditures as share of total public expenditures 
 
Data source: Eurostat COFOG database (see Eurostat 2007 and 2008)  
 
3  Empirical model 
We start our empirical explorations with a baseline model that pools all countries and welfare 
regimes (Equation 1):  
 
                                                                                  (1) 
 
where (i) is the country index (ranging from 1 to 27) and (t) is the year index (ranging from 
1990 to 2006). EXit is the share of social protection expenditures in total public expenditures in 
country (i) and year (t). Git-1 is the one year lagged globalization indicator and Cit-1 is the matrix 
of one year lagged control variables. αi captures country fixed effects, ωt captures time fixed 
effects and εit is the remainder error term.  
To analyze whether globalization exerts a differential impact upon West European countries 
and on CEECs, we estimate the empirical model shown in Equation 1 not only for the full 
sample but also for the Western and Eastern European country groups separately.  
As outlined in section two, the globalization impact on social protection expenditures might 
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vary across welfare regimes. For the West European country group we explore this issue by 
estimating welfare regime specific globalization effects. The empirical model estimated is 
shown in Equation 2:  
 
                                         (2) 
 
where Dj is a dummy variable representing the different welfare regimes. For instance, if j = 1 
D has entry 1 if a country belongs to the social-democratic welfare regime and zero otherwise. 
j = 2 is for the conservative, j = 3 for the southern and j = 4 for the liberal welfare regime. 
Thus, the estimated coefficients βj can be directly interpreted as the marginal effect of a one 
unit increase in the respective globalization indicator on the share of public social protection 
expenditures conditional on the respective welfare regime. Due to data limitations we 
differentiate the globalization variable by welfare regimes but not the control variables 
contained in Cit-1. However, we also control for welfare regime specific time trends, captured 
by  in Equation 2. Including welfare specific time trends aims to capture 
differences in developments over time in social expenditures across welfare regimes. If path-
dependence plays a role, such differences are likely to be present. Note that, as we also 
include a full set of time dummies one of the welfare regime specific trends cannot be 
identified. This is the reason why the second summation index in Equation 2 runs from 1 to 3. 
Also note that including a trend variable in Equation 1 would not change results as we apply 
a two-way fixed effects estimator. 
As shown, all right-hand side variables enter into Equations 1 and 2 with a one year lag. This 
is done for two reasons: First, to cope with time lags in the political decision and budgeting 
process and second, to mitigate potential problems due to reverse causality. A better way to 
cope with endogeneity issues would be to apply a GMM-approach. However, due to the low 
number of cross-sections (countries) a reliable GMM-estimation is precluded (also see 
Potrafke 2009).8 A second best approach is to use lagged values of the right-hand side 
variables (see Wooldridge (2002, pg. 301)). In each estimation the variance-covariance-matrix 
of the remainder error term, εit, is calculated using the approach developed by Newey and 
West (1987). Therefore, standard errors are fully robust with respect to serial correlation as 
well as general heteroscedasticity (see Baum et al. (2007)).9 Estimations are carried out with 
Schaffer’s xtivreg2 Stata command (see Schaffer (2010)). 
 
4  Data issues and control variables  
                                               
8 The cross-sectional dimensions are 18 (Western countries) and 9 (CEECs), respectively. 
9 Newey-West-HAC robust standard errors are chosen as the alternative cluster-robust standard errors 
need a rather large number of clusters (here countries) for reliable inference. Typically a minimum 
cluster dimension of about 50 is required (see Nichols and Schaffer 2007). 
a. Measuring social expenditures 
The data for expenditures on social protection as a share of total expenditures ( ) is taken 
from Eurostat’s COFOG database (Eurostat 2007 and 2008). This database provides 
internationally comparable data on 10 functional expenditure categories, including the item 
“social protection”, capturing inter alia socially motivated expenditures on sickness and 
disability, old age, family and children, survivors, unemployment and housing. 
The novelty and decisive difference of the Eurostat dataset is that it is the first to cover all 27 
EU member states. Data for Western EU member states is generally available from 1990 to 
2006 and is on a consolidated general government level. However, for some countries figures 
are available for a shorter time period only. For the CEECs data is generally available from 
2000 onwards. For the Czech Republic the series starts in 1995. Table A1 in the appendix 
summarizes data availability by country. It shows that we exclude Bulgaria but include Norway 
in the analysis. 
 
b. Measuring globalization 
Globalization is a multi-facetted phenomenon comprising economic, social, institutional and 
political aspects (Dreher (2006b); Dreher et al (2008b)). In empirical work the economic part 
of globalization is frequently operationalized via a country’s openness to trade or FDI (see e.g. 
Dreher et al (2008a); Gemmel et al. (2008)). However, using either trade or FDI to measure 
globalization has several shortcomings. First, FDI and trade may capture different economic 
aspects related to the globalization process. For instance, imports and inward FDI might have 
different effects on domestic workers due to different spill-over effects of these types of 
market integration on the domestic economy (see e.g. Lipsey (2002) on FDI spill-over effects). 
Moreover, according to the OLI-paradigm (Dunning (2001)), to receive inward FDI a country 
has to provide foreign firms with certain location advantages. Thus, receiving FDI instead of 
imports might be based on a pronounced shift in public expenditures in favor of public inputs 
and at the cost of welfare expenditures. Second, FDI is only one particular type of mobile 
capital. For instance, small economies might not receive much FDI, due to their lack of 
location advantages, but might  nevertheless be very open and thus prone to globalization 
effects if they receive huge amounts of portfolio and other types of capital (e.g. Dharmapala 
and Hines (2009) on tax havens). Third, trade and FDI clearly capture only some economic 
aspects of the multi-facetted globalization phenomenon. However, exclusion of social, 
institutional and political dimensions aspects of the globalization phenomenon probably leads 
to biased estimates (see Dreher et al (2008b, pg. 79 on this issue)). For these reasons an 
index of globalization combining trade and FDI with other variables related to the globalization 
process is more appropriate than using trade or FDI in isolation. 
In our analysis we use several proxy variables for the globalization phenomenon, not least to 
explore how results depend on the operationalisation of globalization. Specifically, we apply: 
(i) The sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP to capture trade openness. This 
indicator is  biased, because small countries engage to higher degrees in trade, 
without necessarily being more open. To correct for this small country bias we use the 
method proposed by Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and later also used by Adam and 
Kammas (2007). Thus, we estimate trade as a function of the relative country size 
(GDP of the country as a ratio to the average GDP of the sample) in an auxiliary 
regression and use the residuals of this regression, denoted by , in our 
estimations along with the relative size variable10; 
(ii) The sum of inward and outward FDI stock as a ratio to GDP ( ) to capture 
openness to FDI; 
(iii) Various KOF globalization indices developed by Dreher (2006b) and updated by 
Dreher et al (2008b). The KOF indices are weighted indices of various globalization 
variables. The weights are determined via principal component analysis. Thus, these 
indices capture the globalization process rather broadly. Three different KOF indices 
are used in the analysis: (a)  is based on the actual flows of goods and 
services, income, and capital. This variable not only brings together FDI and trade but 
also adds portfolio investments and income payments to foreign nationals; (b) 
, which incorporates legal restrictions, i.e. de jure measures of formal 
openness such as restrictions on trade and financial flows, in addition to actual flows 
of goods, services, capital, etc; (c) , which combines economic 
globalization with social and political globalization, incorporating the number of 
embassies and high commissions in the country, the number of international 
organizations to which the country is a member of, the number of international treaties 
signed, personal contacts, information flows and cultural proximity (Dreher (2006b)). 
As  captures the globalization phenomenon in the broadest available sense 
it is our preferred globalization measure. 
It has to be stressed that the correlations between trade and FDI, respectively, with the KOF 
indices are relatively low (cf. Table A3). For example, the correlation of trade (FDI) with 
 is 0.46 (0.66). This tends to confirm  the problems associated with measuring the 
globalization phenomenon (see Dreher et al (2008, pg. 271) on this issue).  
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 Rodrik (1998) and Adam and Kammas (2007) also interact a trade variable with terms of trade 
volatility to capture external risk. Rodrik (1998) uses the three or five year averages of the dependent 
variable. The terms of trade risk is the standard deviation of the logarithmic difference of terms of trade 
in sub periods of three or five years . Our panel is too short to calculate meaningful standard deviations, 
especially for the estimations based on CEEC data. Thus, as in Rodrik (1997) we suppose that “the 
riskiness of each country’s trade is absorbed into the fixed effect” (Rodrik, 1997, pg. 61 and footnote 8). 
c. Control variables 
Various control variables enter the -matrix. As there is no accepted theoretical model 
available which dictates the appropriate choice of control variables (also see Dreher et al 
(2008a) on this issue) the variables contained in  are based on the findings of prior 
empirical studies (e.g. Dreher (2006a); Dreher et al (2008a); Gemmel et al (2008); Shelton 
(2007); Sanz and Velazquez (2007)).  
We use the lagged growth rate of real GDP ( ) to capture the influence of the 
economic cycle on the share of social protection expenditures. In a recession, social transfers 
are expected to rise whereas periods of high growth lead to a decrease in unemployment 
claims.  
Another control variable is the one year lagged inflation rate ( ), measured as the 
yearly growth rate in the GDP deflator with base year 1995. This variable intends to capture 
shifts in expenditures due to differences in governmental "price-setting" power  between 
expenditure categories. Specifically, the government behaves more as a price taker for some 
expenditure categories (e.g. expenditures on economic services), but for social protection it 
might be a quasi-monopolist. This difference in price-setting power might have an impact on 
the share of social expenditures in total expenditures. Specifically, because many social 
protection expenditures are not inflation adjusted we expect a negatively signed coefficient. 
Lagged government debt ( ) measured as general government consolidated gross 
debt as a percentage of GDP on the one hand intends to capture constraints of a 
government’s "room for maneuver". In particular, higher debt levels imply higher levels of 
interest payments (e.g. Sanz and Velazquez (2007)) and ceteris paribus a lower share of 
social protection expenditures. From this perspective a negative relationship of this variable 
with the social protection expenditures can therefore be expected. On the other hand, as 
stressed by Sanz and Velazquez (2007) a pressure to reduce public debt in GDP might also 
decrease the share of social protection expenditures, if fiscal adjustment mainly falls “upon 
social welfare so as to protect productive government expenditure” (ibidem, p. 922). Thus, 
also a positive relationship between ( ) and the share of social protection expenditures 
is plausible. A priori the impact of the lagged debt level on the share of social protection 
expenditures is therefore ambiguous. 
The dependency ratio ( ) is measured as the number of persons in the age groups 
0-15 and 65 and over as a ratio of  the working age population. Its lagged value aims to proxy 
the effect of the importance of an inactive population on social expenditures.  The effect of an 
aging society should be particularly well captured by this variable. A positive relationship is 
expected. 
The one year lagged ratio of total public spending to GDP ( ) serves as another 
control variable. This variable intends to capture the importance of the public sector in an 
economy. Specifically, in minimalist states expenditures for social protection are probably of 
relatively low importance (see Dreher et al (2008a)). A positive relationship with the share of 
social protection expenditures is thus expected.  
In order to cope with  small country bias (see Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and above) a 
country’s relative size, ( ) is included in the set of regressors. This variable is measured 
as the proportion of a country’s GDP in relation to  the average sample GDP.  
Note that we do not include a country’s unemployment rate in the empirical model. The 
reason is that  is contained in  which is directly linked with the unemployment 
rate according to the Phillips-curve relationship.11 Furthermore,   is also related to  
the unemployment rate via Okun’s law. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we also 
estimate an empirical model which includes a proxy variable for a country’s unemployment 
rate ( ) instead of its rate of inflation. In this case a positively signed coefficient for  
 is expected. A higher rate of unemployment should ceteris paribus be paired with a 
higher share of social protection expenditures. 
Furthermore we do not include a lagged dependent variable in the empirical models as the 
resulting estimates would suffer from the Nickell-bias. As already noted in section three, 
reliable GMM-estimation is precluded due to the small number of cross-sections. However, 
the inclusion of country and time fixed effects, of welfare specific time trends as well as of 
lagged total expenditures in GDP in the empirical models accounts for inertia in the 
endogenous variable.  
Tables A.2 to A.4 in the appendix contain information on the measurement of the variables, 
the databases used and descriptive statistics.  
 
5 Estimation results 
 
a. Globalization and social protection expenditures in Western Europe and CEECs 
Table 1 shows the results for the baseline model (Equation 1) for the full country sample, 
which pools all countries, as well as for the countries grouped into Western countries and 
CEECs. In specifications (1)-(3) globalization is captured by  and in specifications (4)-
(6) by .  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                               
11 We are grateful to the referee who pointed out this aspect. 
The results indicate that trade openness leads to a significant negative effect on the share of 
social protection expenditures in each country group. For the Western European country 
group this result is supplemented by the negative impact of . Thus, for these 
countries the effects of both individual globalization variables provide evidence in favor of the 
efficiency hypothesis. In contrast, in the CEECs  has a positive effect on the share 
of social protection expenditures. In the pooled sample the coefficient of  is 
negative indicating the dominance of efficiency pressures.12 Diverging results for the CEECs 
are an indication that conclusions concerning  globalization effects on the share of social 
protection expenditures can hinge upon the operationalization of the globalization 
phenomenon.  
Clearly, both variables, trade and FDI volumes, are rather narrow definitions of the multi-
facetted globalization phenomenon. Therefore Table 2 shows results for Equation (1) 
estimated using the three KOF indices of globalization. In specifications (1)-(3) the 
globalization variable is , in specifications (4)-(6) it is , and in 
specifications (7)-(9) globalization is measured in the broadest index via . Again 
results for the full country sample and for countries separated as the Western countries and 
CEECs are shown.  
Table 2 displays several striking differences when compared to Table 1. In Table 2 the 
globalization effect is statistically insignificant albeit positive in the full country sample across 
all three KOF indices. Thus, these results signal that globalization does not exert any effect on 
the share of social protection expenditures at all or that efficiency and compensating effects 
cancel each other out. However, separating countries into West and East European countries 
reveals that in the former country group compensating effects are dominant, whereas in the 
latter efficiency effects prevail . For the Western European country group this evidence in 
favor of the compensation hypothesis is present across all three KOF indices. For the CEECs 
the efficiency effect is derived based on the two broader definitions of globalization, 
 and . 
Note that these results remain valid when we include  together with the restrictions 
part of  in the empirical model . 13 However, this reveals that in the CEECs the 
negative impact of globalization is driven by a reduction in legal restrictions. This may indicate 
that policy makers who deregulated trade and capital controls also decreased the share of 
public spending on social protection in order to create room for fiscal policy to attract FDI or to 
increase the competitiveness of the firms based in the country. In contrast, in the West 
European country group the positive impact stems from an increase in actual flows rather than 
the easing of legal restrictions, which is not implausible given that most legal restrictions were 
                                               
12 Note, these results are robust to the inclusion of  and  simultaneously in the 
empirical model. Detailed results can be received upon request.  
13 Detailed results are omitted for brevity. They are available upon request. 
abolished in these countries before the start of our sample period.  
Taken together the results displayed in Tables 1 and 2 signal the importance of  carefully 
considering the operationalization of the globalization phenomenon. Moreover, results reveal 
that the globalization impact may differ across country groups. Using the KOF indices, which 
capture the multi-facetted phenomenon of globalization better than single trade or FDI 
variables, we conclude  that there is evidence in favor of compensation effects prevailing in 
West European countries and efficiency effects in the CEECs.  
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Regarding control variables, we discuss the results displayed in Table 2 based on the 
broadest measure of globalization ( ). However, the signs and statistical 
significance of the coefficients are rather robust with respect to the choice of the particular 
KOF index. The growth rate of real GDP ( ) is a good predictor of the need for social 
protection: In periods of higher GDP growth rates the share of social protection expenditures 
is lower (also see Potrafke (2009); Dreher (2006a)). However the coefficient is only 
statistically significant in the full country sample and for the West European countries. As 
expected, rising inflation decreases spending on social protection, probably  because social 
benefits are not necessarily inflation adjusted. Again, no statistically significant effect for the 
CEECs is established.  
Higher national debt levels imply higher shares of expenditures on social protection in West 
Europe and in the full sample. In CEECs the effect is not statistically different from zero. This 
positive impact is line with the findings of Sanz and Velazquez (2007). An increase in the 
dependency ratio leads to a rise in the share of social protection expenditures, especially in 
the CEECs. This result is in line with Gemmel et al. (2008) and Sanz and Velazquez (2007) 
who find a positive impact of the share of elderly persons on the share of welfare 
expenditures. The one year lagged total public expenditures as a ratio to GDP have a positive 
effect on the share of social protection in both country groups. However, the effect gains 
statistical significance only in the full country sample. Dreher et al (2008a) find a similar result. 
Larger countries in Western Europe have a lower share of expenditures on social protection, 
as indicated by the negative coefficient of the size variable. Finally, note that time dummies 
are statistically highly significant (jointly). 
It is difficult to compare our results concerning the globalization impact with prior literature. 
Countries and time span considered, econometric approaches applied and measurement of 
the globalization phenomenon vary substantially between the available studies (also see 
Gemmel et al (2008)). Moreover, we have a special focus on Western Europe and the 
CEECs, whereas most other studies are based on a sample of OECD countries. Further, we 
normalize social expenditures by total public expenditures to narrowly capture the expenditure 
priorities set within the public sector. Some other studies normalize by GDP (e.g. Potrafke 
(2009)). Our results based on the trade and FDI volume (cf. Table 1), which indicate the 
dominance of efficiency effects are in line with Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) and 
Garret and Mitchell (2001) (also see Table 1 in Gemmel et al (2008)). Based on panel data 
these authors inter alia also explore globalization effects on the share of social protection 
expenditures using the trade volume as proxy for globalization. On the other hand, our results 
are add odds with the studies of Hicks and Swank (1992), Huber et al (1993) and Bretschger 
and Hettich (2002), who find a positive effect of trade volume on the share of social protection 
expenditures. Moreover, and also in contrast to this study, Dreher et al (2008a) find no effect 
of trade volume on the share of social expenditures. Finally, Gemmel et al. (2008) find a 
positive effect of FDI volume and no effect of openness to trade on the share of social 
expenditures.  
Concerning CEECs  Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) also establish the dominance of 
efficiency effects based on a sample of Latin American countries using the trade volume as 
proxy variable for globalization. Thus, for emerging countries the empirical evidence is rather  
in favor of a squeeze in the share of social expenditures due to globalization.  
Based on the broader KOF indices some studies find that the share of social expenditure is 
essentially unrelated to globalization (Dreher (2006a); Sanz and Velazquez (2007); Dreher et 
al (2008a)). We reach at a similar conclusion if we use the KOF indices and the full country 
sample; however our results indicate the importance of heterogeneity between country 
groups. Gemmel et al (2008) find evidence in favor of the compensation hypothesis in their 
estimations based on the KOF index. 
 
b. Globalization, social expenditures and welfare regimes 
So far we have focused on differences between Western and Eastern European countries. 
Next we control for heterogeneity among welfare states regimes within Western Europe. The 
results are reported in Table 3.  
The results indicate important differences regarding the response to globalization across 
welfare regime and are robust with respect to the choice of the KOF index. Specifically, 
globalization exerts efficiency effects on countries in the social-democratic welfare regime. In 
contrast, the compensation hypothesis is verified for the conservative welfare regime. No 
effect is found for the liberal and southern welfare regimes. Hence, globalization leads  
particularly  to efficiency pressures on the most generous welfare regime. Moreover, some 
evidence of convergence of the social-democratic and the conservative welfare regimes exists 
. As noted, the absence of a statistical relationship between globalization and the share of 
social protection in the southern and the liberal welfare regimes might indicate that there are 
no globalization effects at work at all or that efficiency and compensation effects cancel each 
other out in these welfare regimes.  
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Concerning control variables Table 3 implies that the growth rate of real GDP, the debt level 
and  the importance of the public sector matter for the share of social protection expenditures. 
As expected, the coefficient of  is negative and that of  positive. 
Moreover, some evidence exists  that larger countries have lower shares of social 
expenditures. The time dummies (jointly) as well as the welfare regime specific trends are 
statistically significant. 
The negative impact of globalization on the share of social expenditures in the social-
democratic welfare regime is consistent with the arguments set  out by Huber and Stephens 
(2001) about the welfare retrenchment effects of globalization and limits to t expansion in very 
generous welfare regimes, where tax rates are already high and there is little room to increase 
spending via higher taxation.  Moreover, the predominance of the compensation effect in the 
conservative welfare regime is consistent with Kautto and Kvist (2002) who cite evidence 
demonstrating a “catch-up convergence” in France and Netherlands. In the conservative 
welfare regimes  national institutions, resource dependency, and voters’ interests prevent the 
scaling down of social protection expenditures and create further pressures to meet the 
demand for compensation against the vulnerabilities created by globalization. Our findings are 
also consistent with Achterberg and Yerkes (2009) or Adelantado and Cuevas (2006), who 
show that there is no general trend towards a retrenchment of  welfare regimes.  
 
c. Robustness checks 
We  conducted several robustness checks to explore the sensitivity of our results with respect 
to the control variables included and the econometric approach applied. The robustness 
analysis is based on our preferred specification based on the broadest globalization index, 
 and the split by welfare regimes displayed in Column 3 of Table 3. Table 4 
displays the results of the robustness analysis. Column 1 shows that our results are broadly 
unaltered in case  is substituted by the unemployment rate ( ). As 
expected the coefficient of  carries a positive sign and is statistically significant. The 
only difference compared to our preferred specification is the insignificant impact of . 
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results when a variable indicating the ideology of the 
government cabinet in force is added ( ).14 Political scientists produced a great 
deal of theory  about the impact of partisan politics and political parties on government 
expenditures.15 As  is 1 for hegemony of right-wing parties and 5 for left-wing 
parties we expect its coefficient to have a positive sign. However, Column 2 of Table 4 shows 
that this variable neither enters our preferred specification with a statistically significant effect 
nor does its inclusion change our substantive results. Potrafke (2009) provides some 
evidence that partisan politics might matter for the share of social protection expenditures in 
interaction with globalization, rather than in isolation. However since the aim of this paper is to 
highlight the effects of globalization rather than partisan politics, we do not explore the 
interaction effects further.  
Column 3 and Column 4 show that our substantive results are also robust with respect to the 
exclusion of insignificant variables (  and ) from the preferred 
specification.16 
The specification shown in Column 5 includes the CEECs as a fifth welfare regime. Results 
displayed are fully consistent with those in Column 3 of Table 3 and Column 9 in Table 2: 
Efficiency effects dominate in social-democratic countries and in CEECs whereas the 
evidence is in favor of the compensation hypothesis in the conservative welfare regime. 
Again, no effect is established for the liberal and the southern welfare regimes. 
Finally, Column 6 of Table 4 shows that our results are also unaltered if we exclude time 
dummies and correct non-parametrically for contemporaneous correlation in residuals.17 
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6 Summary and conclusions 
This paper has analyzed  the effects of globalization on the share of expenditures on social 
protection in total public expenditures in European countries. The novelty of the paper is that 
we test the heterogeneity of the globalization effects on social protection expenditures in 
different country groups and welfare regimes. Moreover, globalization is measured by 
alternative indicators like the openness to trade and FDI as well as various KOF globalization 
indices. The latter have the advantage of  bringing together further dimensions of economic 
                                               
14 See Armingeon et al. (2009). 
15
 See Cusack (1997) for an overview.  
16 We also examine the robustness of the CEEC specific results displayed in Column 9 of Table 2 with 
respect to the exclusion of insignificant control variables. This leads to an empirical model including 
 and  as well as the time dummies. The coefficient on the globalization variable 
carries a statistically significant value of -0.79. The coefficient of the dependency ratio is statistically 
significant with a value of 2.69. Results will be provided  upon request. 
17
 These results are based on Hoechle’s xtscc Stata command (see Hoechle 2007) which calculates 
Driscoll-Kraay type standard errors.  
globalization like portfolio investments, income payments to foreigners, de jure measures like 
capital controls and trade restrictions as well as social and political globalization. Thus, the 
KOF indices have advantages as they capture the multi-facetted globalization phenomenon 
more broadly than proxies based on single aspects, like trade and FDI volume. Welfare 
regimes used are based on an "augmented" Esping-Andersen” typology. 
There are important differences between Eastern and Western Europe as well as among 
welfare regimes in Western Europe. Regarding Western Europe, globalization measured by 
the KOF indices leads to an increased share of social protection expenditures. This finding is 
consistent with the view that the demand for protection against vulnerability and income 
losses in the age of globalization outweighs efficiency pressures exerted by globalization. 
Thus, the evidence provided here is in favor of the compensation hypothesis. Regarding the 
CEECs the analysis implies that globalization leads to a significant decline in the share of 
social protection expenditures. Hence, the CEECs verify the efficiency hypothesis.  
There are further differences between  the welfare regimes within Western Europe. The share 
of social protection is increasing due to globalization in the conservative welfare regime and 
decreasing in the social-democratic welfare regime. Moreover, we find that our globalization 
variables are unrelated to  the share of social protection expenditures in the liberal and 
southern welfare regimes. This implies that globalization has no effect at all in these regimes 
or that efficiency and compensation effects cancel each other out. 
Although our analysis implies that the effects of globalization on social protection expenditures 
should be analyzed by disaggregating the welfare regimes and country groups, we  stress that 
the results derived are based on a rather limited data set, especially for CEECs. Thus, results 
are indicative rather than conclusive. Further empirical analysis of the topic is clearly needed.  
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Table A.1: Data availability by country 
 
Country Data availability 
Belgium 1990 - 2006 
Czech Republic 1995 - 2006 
Denmark 1990 – 2006 
Germany 1991 - 2006 
Estonia 1995 - 2006 
Ireland 1991 - 2006 
Greece 1990 - 2006 
Spain 1995 - 2006 
France 1995 - 2005 
Italy 1990 - 2006 
Cyprus 1998 - 2006 
Latvia 1998 - 2006 
Lithuania 2002 - 2006 
Luxemburg 1990 - 2006 
Hungary 2001 - 2006 
Malta 1995 - 2006 
Netherlands 1995 - 2006 
Austria 1995 - 2006 
Poland 2002 - 2006 
Portugal 1990 - 2006 
Romania 2002 - 2005 
Slovenia 2000 - 2006 
Slovakia 2003 - 2005 
Finland 1990 - 2006 
Sweden 1995 - 2006 
United Kingdom 1990 - 2006 
Norway 1990 - 2006 
 
  
 
 
  
Table A.2: Definition of variables, data sources and expected relationship with social 
protection expenditures 
 
Variable Source Definition Expected sign 
EXit Eurostat New Cronos Database 
Social Protection expenditures 
according to COFOG Classification 
as proportion of total expenditures 
Endogenous 
variable 
growthit-1 Eurostat New Cronos Database 
Real GDP growth rate – annual 
change in real GDP 
- 
unempit-1 
Eurostat New Cronos Database; 
AMECO Database 
Unemployment persons as a share 
of total active population. According 
to labor force surveys 
+ 
inﬂation it-1 Eurostat New Cronos Database 
GDP deﬂator, measured as rate of 
change on previous year; base year 
1995 
- 
debt it-1 
Eurostat New Cronos Database; 
AMECO Database 
General government consolidated 
gross debt divided by GDP 
? 
dependit-1 Eurostat New Cronos Database 
Total number persons of age when 
they are economically inactive (0-
15 and 65 and over) divided by the 
number of persons of working age 
(from 15 to 64) 
+ 
govpartyit-1 
Comparative Political Data Set III 
from the University of Berne 
Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 
5. "1" indicates hegemony of right-
wing and center parties, whereas 
"5" stands for hegemony of social 
democratic and other left parties 
+ 
expend it-1 Eurostat New Cronos Database 
Total government expenditures 
divided by GDP 
+ 
size it-1 Eurostat New Cronos Database 
Country GDP divided by sample 
average GDP 
? 
tradeit-1 Own Calculations 
Residuals from an auxiliary 
regression of “trade” on “size” and a 
constant (See Bretschger and 
Hettich 2002). 
Variable of 
main interest 
fdistock it-1 
UNCTAD World Investment 
Report 
Sum of inward and outward stock of 
FDI divided by GDP 
Variable of 
main interest 
KOFflows it-1 
Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology, Zurich, 
Konjunkturforschungsstelle 
Index from 1 to 100 consisting of 
trade, FDI flows, FDI stock, portfolio 
investment and income payments 
to foreign nationals, weighted 
according to a principal component 
analysis. 
Variable of 
main interest 
KOFecon it-1 
Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology, Zurich, 
Konjunkturforschungsstelle 
Composite index from 1 to 100 of 
KOFflows and KOF-restrictions, 
which is an indicator of de-jure 
openness. 
Variable of 
main interest 
KOFglob it-1 
Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology, Zurich, 
Konjunkturforschungsstelle 
Overall globalization index from 1 to 
100, which includes KOFecon but 
also indices on social and political 
globalization. 
Variable of 
main interest 
 
Table A.3: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 
  growth unemp inﬂation  debt  govparty depend expend  size  trade fdistock  KOFflows  KOFecon  KOFglob  
growth 1.00 
            unemp 0.06 1.00 
           inﬂation  0.11 0.00 1.00 
          debt  -0.39 0.24 -0.11 1.00 
         govparty 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.06 1.00 
        depend -0.09 -0.08 -0.13 0.14 0.13 1.00 
       expend  -0.56 0.04 -0.29 0.46 0.18 0.25 1.00 
      size  -0.32 0.13 -0.22 0.24 0.10 0.12 0.15 1.00 
     trade 0.28 -0.28 -0.14 -0.32 -0.14 -0.08 -0.34 0.01 1.00 
    fdistock  0.10 -0.32 -0.15 -0.18 -0.11 0.16 -0.20 -0.12 0.70 1.00 
   KOFflows  0.32 -0.38 -0.21 -0.24 -0.09 0.04 -0.22 -0.45 0.64 0.73 1.00 
  KOFecon  0.30 -0.34 -0.29 -0.23 -0.03 0.12 -0.13 -0.38 0.61 0.71 0.92 1.00 
 KOFglob  0.10 -0.37 -0.44 -0.03 0.01 0.18 0.09 -0.16 0.46 0.66 0.79 0.87 1.00 
 
Note: for convenience are time and country identifier excluded 
 
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EXit overall 0.360 0.057 0.208 0.477 
 
between 
 
0.056 0.223 0.448 
 
within 
 
0.017 0.291 0.418 
growthit-1 overall 0.035 0.027 -0.062 0.160 
 
between 
 
0.020 0.013 0.083 
 
within 
 
0.020 -0.052 0.138 
unempit-1 overall 0.077 0.034 0.016 0.196 
 
between 
 
0.035 0.030 0.175 
 
within 
 
0.018 0.032 0.151 
inﬂation it-1 overall 0.035 0.035 -0.019 0.243 
 
between 
 
0.032 0.011 0.171 
 
within 
 
0.027 -0.021 0.204 
debt it-1 overall 0.548 0.307 0.038 1.377 
 
between 
 
0.277 0.055 1.150 
 
within 
 
0.095 0.253 0.965 
govpartyit-1 overall 2.767 1.450 1.000 5.000 
 
between 
 
0.883 1.000 4.909 
 
within 
 
1.236 0.142 5.585 
dependit-1 overall 0.490 0.036 0.402 0.606 
 
between 
 
0.037 0.406 0.552 
 
within 
 
0.016 0.434 0.578 
expend it-1 overall 0.464 0.068 0.315 0.647 
 
between 
 
0.065 0.336 0.574 
 
within 
 
0.028 0.388 0.565 
size it-1 overall 1.176 1.644 0.011 7.088 
 
between 
 
1.540 0.012 6.013 
 
within 
 
0.212 -0.094 2.251 
tradeit-1 overall 0.041 0.461 -0.678 1.925 
 
between 
 
0.407 -0.609 1.297 
 
within 
 
0.128 -0.444 0.668 
fdistock it-1 overall 0.608 0.499 0.095 2.704 
 
between 
 
0.544 0.153 2.314 
 
within 
 
0.219 -0.027 1.293 
KOFflows it-1 overall 0.748 0.157 0.380 0.998 
 
between 
 
0.131 0.474 0.993 
 
within 
 
0.068 0.497 0.891 
KOFecon it-1 overall 0.812 0.097 0.574 0.987 
 
between 
 
0.083 0.653 0.962 
 
within 
 
0.047 0.630 0.938 
KOFglob it-1 overall 0.810 0.069 0.604 0.926 
 
between 
 
0.060 0.691 0.905 
 
within 
 
0.035 0.676 0.878 
 
 
